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ESSAYS
Energy Security in Russia – EU Partnership
Klemen Grošelj
Abstract: In this article our aim is to reﬂ ect on complex and multidimensional re-
lations between EU and Russia, with special focus on energy relations which seems 
to be in the heart of this quite peculiar economic interdependence. To do this it is 
necessary to look at a wider aspect of EU – Russia relations with special attention 
and exposure of different perceptions on mutual relations. Descending from this 
wider frame of mutual relations the main analysis is focused on question if EU – 
Russia and to some extend even EU member states – Russia relations, are based 
on idea of cooperation or competition. Since the focal point is energy security the 
article is trying to deﬁ ne energy security from different point of views, because 
the perception and deﬁ nition of energy security is not the same for EU, Russia or 
transit states for Russian energy. Nevertheless the energy security issue is most 
pressing for EU and its member states, due to presented statistical date on growing 
dependence of EU on import of energy in general and with special emphasize to its 
growing dependence on Russian energy resources. Article is trying to present major 
challenges laying ahead for EU and Russia in their energy cooperation in the frame 
of different future scenarios of global energy market development.
Keywords: EU, Russia, energy, energy security, energy dependence, Russia – 
EU partnership
Introduction
The worldwide rise of energy prices in the past few years, inﬂ uenced, among 
other factors, by political and military tension in the Middle East and the Gulf, 
has also affected the EU. In light of the mounting tension between Russia and 
former Soviet transit countries, ﬁ erce discussions on energy security in the EU have 
been further exacerbated by rising EU energy dependence on imports from Russia. 
Even though the price of energy fell substantially with the beginning of the global 
recession, the question of the reliability of energy supply from Russia was further 
raised by the last gas war between Russia and Ukraine in January 2009. It was not 
the ﬁ rst time that the question of the reliability of Russia as an energy supplier had 
been addressed in the EU, but it was the ﬁ rst time that many countries in the EU 
suffered a shortage of gas supplies which affected their economies and societies as 
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a whole. Further, the question of energy imports from Russia became a strategic 
political question in the EU, and this will become even more important as the EU, 
in the process of its own enlargement, approaches the borders of the former Soviet 
Union and Russia. The summer war of 2008 in Georgia proved the relevance of this 
issue and the interplay of energy and EU expansion very plainly and, unfortunately, 
violently. The aim of this article is to present the comprehensive complexities of 
Russian -EU relations in light of so -called energy security. The starting point of the 
analysis is the general frame of these relations and crucial points of both entities 
in regard to wider European security and stability. This will be followed by an 
analysis of the energy policy options available to both the EU and Russia with the 
aim of establishing a future policy acceptable to both sides.
Regardless of all the uncertainties of the last few years, the EU has become al-
most as strong economically as the US (Walker, 1999). It has, however, lagged 
behind in the ﬁ eld of expressing a credible and common EU foreign policy mes-
sage. In other words it still acts more as a group of states than a global player in a 
modern international community. In parallel with its growing economic strength, 
the EU has identiﬁ ed the need for strengthening its political and security integration 
within its Member States, which would make it possible for the EU to forge mutual 
relationships with non member states. The result is the EU Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) on one hand and a wide range of agreements between the 
EU and crucial non -member states on the other. One of these, which represent the 
foundation of EU -Russia cooperation, is the Partnership and Cooperation Agree-
ment of 1997. This agreement is a reﬂ ection of the goals which Russia and the EU 
were trying to achieve in the 1990s. Its major aim was to create a true strategic 
partnership based on mutually shared interests and values in the frame of bilateral 
and multilateral cooperation. It was based on the idea of common values and aspira-
tions. This agreement was also intended to be benevolent to Russia, especially since 
the aim was to strengthen the Russian economy and facilitate its modernization 
and integration in the global economy. Last but not least, this agreement aimed to 
enhance trust and cooperation in the ﬁ eld of security between the EU and Russia.
At the St. Petersburg Summit in May 2003, the EU and Russia agreed to create 
four‘ common spaces’ in the framework of the agreement: a Common Economic 
Space; a Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice; a Space of co -operation 
in the ﬁ eld of External Security; and a Common Space for Research and Education, 
including Cultural Aspects. The overriding objective of all four Common Spaces 
was to strengthen the strategic partnership between the EU and Russia across a 
broad range of policy domains (Country Strategy Paper 2007-13; Russian Fed-
eration, 2007: 4-5). Furthermore, this agreement attempted to strengthen political, 
social and economic stability in the European region and also globally. In spite of 
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the progress and growth in trade, EU -Russia relations are strained by the ongoing 
crisis in the North Caucasus and also by EU concerns about the state and future de-
velopment of democracy in Russia. In this context the last few EU -Russia Summits 
were burdened by the differences between both sides in many areas (moratorium 
on the implementation of the CFE -1A Agreement, tensions in South Caucasus…). 
Negative sentiment in the EU was also caused by other statements and actions 
by different high -ranking Russian ofﬁ cials and‘ sabre rattling’, all of which could 
hamper the progress of the aforementioned common spaces. Also, EU enlargement 
once again brought the problem of the so -called frozen conﬂ icts in the CIS – cor-
ruption, organized crime, etc. – to the attention of the EU. One of the problems 
straining EU -Russia relations was the stalemate in negotiations for a new EU – 
Russia agreement. Negotiations were, due to a number of various different reasons, 
on hold, and only at the EU -Russia summit in Khanty – Mansiysk in 2008 was the 
fragile agreement on the start of the negotiations reached, and then put in jeopardy 
by the war in Georgia in Anugust 2008. Even though the EU and Russia have a 
strategic framework of cooperation in the agreement from 1997, on which exten-
sion both sides agreed, the need for a new agreement is evident more then ever, due 
to the changed nature of relations in the world community and also between both 
partners, and especially since energy is spelled out as one of most important ﬁ elds 
of mutual cooperation and economic development (see EU – Russia Summit: The 
start of New Age, 2008). The statement from this Summit also clearly expresses the 
interdependence between the EU and Russia in the ﬁ eld of energy and economic 
development, despite harsh rhetoric from the Russian side.
Besides political, cultural and economic reasons, energy is one of the reasons 
why the EU should not ignore or even block Russia. Instead it should create a 
more pragmatic policy towards Russia, based on the strict observation of European 
values and interests, but with a certain level of realism and pure pragmatism in 
regard to Russia. The EU must accept that in some areas the EU and Russia’s in-
terests are not necessary compatible, but we must still cooperate on many other 
issues of mutual interest. However, at this point we must say that the relations and 
cooperation between the EU and Russia are deﬁ ned by the interaction of two levels 
of politics. The ﬁ rst level is composed of different common EU policies such as 
CFSP and EU -Russia agreements, while the second level consists of a mixture of 
various national policies. The differences between these two levels may sometimes 
have very positive, but also negative inﬂ uences on EU -Russia relations. It should 
be clear to us that any differences between these two levels give the other side the 
upper hand in many ongoing negotiation processes.
If we now look at the Russian side of these relations we can see that the Russian 
policy towards the EU can be split into two periods. The ﬁ rst period was marked by 
8Energy Security in Russia – EU Partnership Klemen Grošelj
close and genuine Russian cooperation with the EU and the West in different areas 
of common interests. What was especially positive was the Russian perspective on 
EU CFSP, because this view was compatible with the so -called Primakov’s doctrine 
of a multi -polar world, in which the EU should be one of many power centres. That 
is why Russian foreign policy saw CFSP as a step towards greater EU independ-
ence from the US; CFSP was seen as the counterweight to a NATO -centric Europe 
(Rontoyanin, 2002: 814). All these Russian expectations ended with the expansion 
of NATO, where NATO became the main security organization in Europe and CFSP 
was to a great extent dependent on its technical, organizational and other support. 
In response, Russia formed its so -called pragmatic foreign policy, which empha-
sises Russian interests and, in regard to the EU, favours bilateral relations with key 
Member States. The Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov (2007) describes this policy 
as multi -vector, stiff and non -confrontational in pursuing vital Russian national in-
terests. The focus points of this policy are the major powers, which are of strategic 
importance to Russia, and which include EU Member States like Germany, France 
and the UK. With those states, Russia is trying to enhance cooperation in different 
areas, energy being the dominant one, especially outside the EU framework. But at 
the same time Russia is cooling down its relations with other EU Member States 
(Poland, the Baltic States, etc.). Besides, Russia increasingly perceives EU enlarge-
ment as a source of the strengthening of anti -Russian forces in Europe and the CIS 
and it has also created a public perception of Russian policies as non -European and 
even as anti -European (Karaganov, 2007a). Even though we cannot describe rela-
tions between the EU and Russia as pure power play, there are some aspects which 
point out that the Russian perception at least is based on a realist security paradigm 
of power play for areas of inﬂ uence. Russia sees the EU (particularly in terms of EU 
neighbourhood policy and relations with former SU states) as a possible competitor 
for inﬂ uence in the areas of vital Russian interest; especially in the unacceptable 
Caspian -Caucasus region and Central Asia. As such, Russia is especially worried 
by EU claims that Russia is not a reliable energy supplier and that the EU needs 
new gas and oil pipelines bypassing Russia (Karaganov, 2007b). This is becoming 
the main reason why energy issues are at the heart of EU -Russia relations.
EU -Russia energy dialogue or competition?
Since the focal point of the EU -Russia dialogue is energy security, it is necessary 
to deﬁ ne what energy security is. But beforehand we should look at what security 
is in general. Energy security is based on the importance of energy for the compre-
hensive economic life and functioning of the modern societies. This is the reason 
why energy security is perceived as (Johnson, 2005: 256) what and how much of a 
risk is connected to a certain energy supplier and/or energy source. The modern EU 
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understanding of energy security can be deﬁ ned as (European Commission, 2004) 
„managing demand, diversiﬁ cation of energy sources by using renewable sources, 
creation of a streamlined internal energy market and controlling external supply 
by reaching special relations with supplier countries«, while the Final report in the 
Green Paper »Towards a European strategy for the security of energy supply« de-
ﬁ nes energy security as (European Commission, 2002) »ensuring diversiﬁ cation by 
energy source, supply countries and supply routes is widely seen as the key response 
to growing import dependence«. This security is subdivided into long -term security 
(stable energy policy within the EU and between the EU and energy supplying 
countries) and short -term security (capability of avoiding cuts in energy supplies 
resulting from extraordinary circumstances). In this respect, Johnson (2005: 257) 
identiﬁ es two risks to EU energy security: increase in consumption, and risks not 
directly related to energy sources. On the other hand, Spajner (2007: 2890) deﬁ nes 
energy security as system security, which includes having a stable energy supply in 
requested quantities in the present as well as in the foreseeable future. Regardless 
of all efforts we cannot avoid energy dependence, because this dependence is the 
result of available energy sources, transit routes and their capacities under accept-
able price. We can now deﬁ ne energy security as the security of sufﬁ cient quantities 
of energy at economically acceptable prices, from different and dispersed sources 
and transit routes. At this point it is important to stress that there is no uniﬁ ed 
EU deﬁ nition of energy security for all member states, which still have their own 
national deﬁ nitions and, unfortunately for the common EU energy market, also na-
tional energy policies, which are not necessarily in line with EU policy. Saying that, 
it is also true that after the events involving Russian gas in 2009 all EU member 
states become aware of a need for more uniﬁ ed energy security policy and above all 
of a need for lowering its energy dependence on one energy source and supplier.
The aforementioned deﬁ nition is viable mainly for the EU, while on the side of 
the non -EU member states, especially for s.c. transit states for Russian gas and oil 
intended for EU markets and for Russia itself, the understanding of energy secu-
rity is different. For states like Ukraine, Belarus and to certain extent also Turkey, 
which is becoming an important transit country for Russian energy to EU markets, 
the question of energy security is a twofold issue. One issue is access to energy 
sources at a reasonable price for its national needs. This is especially relevant for 
countries like Ukraine and Belarus whose economies depend heavily on energy 
at below market prices. Secondly, for these countries energy security is also com-
posed of security of transit of energy from Russia intended for EU markets, which 
represents important national income for transit states. Out of a total of 225 billion 
cubic meters of gas exported by Gazprom, 83 billion cubic meters ﬂ ows across 
Ukraine and 35 billion cubic meters across Belarus. In total almost all gas intended 
for EU markets crosses either Ukraine or Belarus (Excessive Pipeline Projects of 
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Gazprom – 1). For these countries energy security is therefore composed of fulﬁ ll-
ing national energy needs at an acceptable price (not necessarily market price), 
and of energy transport security. The balance of both is crucial not only for their 
economic development but also for their international political development and 
integration into a wider Euroatlantic space.
For Russia, energy security is mainly perceived as being a reliable energy supplier 
to its main foreign partners. This means providing sufﬁ cient amounts of energy to 
main export partners at the best possible price and a low transit cost. That is why the 
Russian state gas company Gazprom is trying to gain a dominant market position in 
EU energy market, and why it is trying not only to monopolize sources of energy, 
but also to control export routes. Energy security in Russia or at least in the Russian 
ruling elite is perceived not only as economic security, but also as a fundamental as-
pect of wider national security of the state, since energy exports and the related in-
come are deﬁ ned as the main development impetus for the whole Russian economy 
and state. The latter is evident from the series of strategic government documents 
on the development of the Russian economy in which the energy sector is deﬁ ned 
as the engine of development of the Russian economy and society. The importance 
of energy exports is clearly seen in the fact that in 2005 it represented 63 per cent of 
all exports and 37 per cent of all state revenues (The Energy Security Series, 2006). 
This share will be in the face of the gloomy economic prospects for 2009 and worse 
to come (World Bank, 2009). As is evident from the new Russian National security 
strategy to 2020 (Strategija nacionalnoj bezopastnosti Rosssikoj Federacij do 2020 
goda, 2008), the question of energy security in Russia will become more politicised 
and will be increasingly in the domain of Russian foreign and security policy
Energy security is as such a complex issue heavily dependent on whether the 
country is an exporter or importer of energy. However in both cases it is composed 
of the reliable extraction, transit and supply of energy at an acceptable or fair mar-
ket price. In any other case energy security is endangered for all involved. As men-
tioned before, energy, especially natural gas and oil, is at the heart of EU -Russia 
cooperation. It is a cooperation based upon close interconnected dependence due 
to the fact that 60 per cent of Russia’s total export is oil, 60 per cent of all exported 
Russian oil ends up on the EU markets and in 2008 this represented 33 per cent 
of all oil imported in the EU. In the case of natural gas, 50 per cent of all Russian 
natural gas is exported to the EU and this represents 42 per cent of all natural gas 
imported in the EU. In the case of coal some 42 per cent of all coal imported to the 
EU comes from Russia (European Commission, 2008).
In this respect CEE member states where dependence on imported gas is 70 per 
cent, 92 per cent of which comes from Russia, are even more exposed than average 
EU member states. Further, the trend of increasing oil and gas imports from Russia 
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and the general growing dependency on the importation of energy, together with the 
fact that some 6.3 per cent of world oil reserves are in Russia and, in case of gas Rus-
sia being (besides Iran and Qatar) one of the few countries with proven reserves above 
2 per cent of world reserves (European Commission, 2008), is clearly forcing the EU 
to establish an EU -Russia energy partnership as a way to secure the energy security 
of both sides. In this respect, access to Russian energy resources from the EU point of 
view, and access to the EU market for Russia as an export country, is economically the 
most attractive and lucrative partnership. As Johnson (2005: 257-62) states, this is in 
line with two major strategies available to the EU in providing for its energy security 
and lowering its energy dependence. The ﬁ rst is to cut consumption by introducing 
new, mainly renewable energy sources, and ﬁ nding new energy sources or energy 
suppliers. This is a viable long -term strategy, while the only short -term strategy is to 
foster close relations and partnerships with the main suppliers of energy to the EU. 
At the moment EU policy is based on a combination of both strategies, especially in 
relation to Russia, where the EU is trying to reach some kind of a mutually beneﬁ cial 
energy partnership. The main reason for this, as Johnson (2005: 264) concludes, is the 
growing EU dependence on gas imports from Russia, which is, on one hand, the result 
of a general trend of increasing EU dependence on energy imports, and on the other 
hand the result of a growing dependence on Russian gas and oil pipeline networks, 
which makes Russian energy sources more attractive to the EU. This trend is most ob-
vious in gas imports where dependence on Russia has increased because the majority 
of new Member States depend heavily on imports from Russian gas pipelines. Even 
though pipelines are a very inﬂ exible mode of energy transport and usually limit the 
choices of gas suppliers to one producer, they are still the most efﬁ cient form of gas 
transport available at the moment. This dependence cannot be overcome in the near 
future, because the construction of new pipelines is a demanding undertaking, both 
technically and economically. Besides, routing new pipelines is always a politically 
complex and intense process, which proves to be of great importance in EU -Russia 
relations. Today’s pipeline network forces both sides to cooperate, as this network 
increases mutual interdependence. This will last at least until Russia constructs its 
pipeline network to the Far East (Far eastern pipeline) and/or until EU secures a pipe-
line connection to the Central Asia, bypassing Russia (project Nabucco). This is also 
the reason why the EU has been trying for almost a decade to formalize its energy 
relations with Russia with the Energy Charter, which Russia has declined to ratify on 
the grounds that it does not suit Russian energy interests.
Since these relations are not institutionalised to the extent the EU wants them 
to be, Correlje and van der Linde1 (2006: 537–8) conclude that the EU is facing 
1 This is part of a wider and more detailed Study on Energy Supply Security and Geopolitics, avail-
able at. http://ec.europa.eu/comm/energy_transport/doc/2004_lv_ciep_report_en.pdf, 20/8/2007.
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sudden and creeping supply gaps2, which I will call gradual supply disruptions. 
Sudden disruptions are usually the consequences of political decisions or military 
conﬂ ict, technical failures or disasters. Gradual supply disruptions, on the other 
hand, are a result of processes which are not sudden or single events, and which 
demand long -term planning and searching for new sources and energy supply 
routes. In both cases the EU has to develop different strategies for confronting both 
types of disruption. However before deﬁ ning these strategies, we must deﬁ ne two 
major scenarios for future developments in the global energy market, which will 
determine the nature of these EU strategies. The ﬁ rst strategy is called Markets and 
Institutions (MI), and the second is Regions and Empires (RE) (Correlje in Van 
der Linde, 2006: 535–6). I will label those two scenarios as realistic and liberal. 
The liberal scenario is optimistic and is based on the assumption of an intensive 
social, cultural and economic internationalisation and globalisation of markets and 
international relations. It is based on an idea of intensive cooperation among states 
and nations and envisages a multiparty state system which governs the interna-
tional community and strengthens international institutions, and the liberalisation 
of markets and market forces in international trade and exchange. On the contrary, 
the realistic scenario has a pessimistic perspective on the future development of 
international political and economic systems. It envisages ideological, religious, 
regional and state -based partitions of the world. In this world different political, 
ideological, regional and strategic blocks are caught in ﬁ erce competition. Different 
national and regional security dilemmas limit international economic integration 
and all economic activities are heavily regulated. Since there is no global market 
for strategic commodities, their trade is based on bilateral trade agreements among 
states and blocks. This further strengthens different blocks with satellite regions 
joining the race for markets and energy sources. The nature of EU -Russia rela-
tions and especially the EU -Russia energy partnership depends on which scenario 
prevails or which assumptions are dominant in the international community. Ac-
cording to the realistic scenario, Russia and the EU will be two blocks competing 
for sources and arranging mutual trade with trade agreements, while in the liberal 
scenario the EU and Russia will gradually form a common space of free trade.
In the case of either scenario the EU should, according to Correlje in van der 
Linde (2006: 539–541), develop the following strategies to cope with possible dis-
ruptions of energy supply:
a) Prevention (in the liberal scenario the aim is to strengthen the international 
institutions and energy markets; in the realistic scenario long -term bilateral 
trade agreements are crucial).
2 It deﬁ nes the following types of gaps: as a result of lack of investment climate and as a result of 
religious and ideological choice (Correl and van Linde /2006/).
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b) Deterrence (in the liberal scenario it is necessary to strengthen the role and 
powers of the UN and Security Council to enable them to enforce sanctions 
and authorize peace operations to solve different conﬂ icts; while the realistic 
scenario is based on effective and strong military force).
c) Containment (the liberal scenario does not envisage any crucial role for 
containment; in the realistic scenario this is a crucial mechanism of damage 
control).
d) Crisis management is equally relevant for both scenarios and envisages the 
creation of strategic reserves of energy, regimes of reduced energy use, etc.
Regardless of different scenarios and strategies, the EU faces different options re-
garding its energy security. The ﬁ rst is to leave this issue to the individual Member 
States and their ability to achieve beneﬁ cial bilateral agreements with the producing 
countries, with or without any wider EU framework. The next option is to establish 
a comprehensive EU energy policy which will ensure that all Member States have a 
secure and stable energy supply. This will also beneﬁ t producing countries, because 
the agreement with the EU will grant them access to one of the biggest energy 
markets in the world. However this will be possible only if, as Correlje and van 
der Linde (2006: 542) claim, the EU develops an internal energy market capable of 
overcoming sudden and gradual supply disruptions using alternative energy sources 
and ensuring the necessary strategic stocks. Nevertheless, the EU must develop its 
own internal and external capabilities, which will enable it to materialise its energy 
vis -à-vis the producing countries. This also means that it is necessary to develop 
true EU military capabilities, independent of the US in many respects.
Another option in this respect is the creation of a regional energy market or EU-
-centric geo -energy space. Mane -Estrada (2006: 3774–3784) claims that the forming 
of a truly liberal global energy market is an illusion and that the only option is to cre-
ate a common geo -energy space in which consumer, transit and producing countries 
cooperate to achieve optimum beneﬁ cial results for all participating countries. This 
would mean that the EU should try to create such a common geo -energy space to-
gether with Russia, the Caspian States and Turkey. This space would be regulated by 
multilateral agreements and above all by the mutual dependence of all participating 
countries. In this way all countries could fulﬁ l their interests and aims without com-
petition, insecurity and tension. However this would demand from every participating 
country the acceptance of an inclusive energy policy and that they try to avoid, as 
much as possible, narrow and exclusive national energy policies.
We must of course take into account the fact that Russia also has its own choices 
in creating it energy policy or, as Rutland (1999) said, development paradigms of 
energy policy. Rutland (1999) identiﬁ es the following:
14
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a) Kuwaitization: envisages the energy sector as the resource provider and start-
ing point for the development of the Russian economy and society.
b) Liberalization: in this paradigm the Russian energy sector should develop in 
accordance with market forces and without any state regulation or red tape.
c) Rent seeking: in this paradigm the energy sector is controlled by small 
managerial -political elite, which seek rents and proﬁ ts from the energy sec-
tor's monopolistic position in the exports of oil and gas.
d) Russian bear: means state control over the energy sector, which makes Rus-
sia a great power with interests locally and abroad.
e) Pluralistic school«: a state in which rival groups compete for control over the 
energy sector.
Russia as an energy producing country has some unique characteristics, which 
considerably strengthen its position in the world markets. These characteristics are 
(Mane -Estrada, 2006: 3778–9):
a) Russia not only pumps and exports oil and gas, but it also reﬁ nes and proc-
esses them and is present in different markets thanks to its geography and 
centralized and wide network of oil and gas pipelines. This enables Russia 
to cover an area spanning from Europe to the Far East and from the Mediter-
ranean to the Indian and Paciﬁ c Ocean.
b) Russia also has its own integrated and vertically developed oil companies, 
which are capable not only of developing their own capabilities, but also of 
investing abroad.
c) Russia is also a relatively developed industrialized country with quite a strong 
non -energy industrial base.
d) Increasing demands for oil and gas in different parts of the world lead to an 
even stronger position for Russia as an energy -producing country.
The Russian energy sector also faces many challenges and dilemmas. One of them 
is the problem of double pricing the export and home use of gas and oil, which lowers 
the incomes of the Russian energy sector. The unﬁ nished transition from command 
to market economy and non -transparent privatisation put additional pressure on the 
sector. There is also the problem of internal political unwillingness to allow foreign 
investments; further, in the last few years we have witnessed some kind of a rena-
tionalisation of the energy sector and the political pressure to control state energy re-
sources with the help of a loyal managerial elite. All of the abovementioned problems 
limit the transfer of know -how and slow the development of the energy sector. The 
lack of a clear and transparent legal framework is also an important disadvantage for 
further development. In spite of all these problems Russia remains the second largest 
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oil and ﬁ rst gas producing country in the world, which in addition possesses one of 
the world’s biggest known deposits of oil and gas (Johnson, 2005: 266–71). Because 
of this, Gazprom, a Russian natural gas monopolist, has become one of the biggest 
energy companies with ambitions to spread its operations into the EU, which causes 
additional problems in the EU -Russia relations (see Spajner, 2007: 2892). The EU 
sees Gazprom as a threat to its energy market and demands from Russia the division 
of Gazprom and liberalization of the gas industry. However, Russia refuses to lose 
this increasingly important tool of its foreign policy.
The question of transport routes is an open issue in EU -Russia relations and an 
area of cooperation which could seen as a power play between entities. Paradoxi-
cally, opposing interests in the transit countries are the main cause of energy related 
tensions between the EU and Russia. This was especially obvious after the orange 
revolution in Ukraine and the gas war which followed. As mentioned before, the 
last gas war proved that energy can become an important foreign policy issue in 
EU -Russia relations, especially since there are more and more indicators that en-
ergy is becoming a tool or an instrument of Russian foreign policy not only towards 
Ukraine and transit states in general, but also in relations with the EU. In response 
to transit difﬁ culties Russia started seeking solutions to this problem, beginning 
the construction of new alternative pipelines to the EU and the Far East. The most 
important pipeline projects to Europe are the Northern Stream under the Baltic Sea 
and the South Stream under the Black Sea and across the Balkans, which will en-
able Russia to bypass unfriendly transit countries and export gas directly to western 
markets. What is astonishing is the fact that these projects are based more at a 
bilateral level than at an EU level. Russia has succeeded in persuading individual 
EU member states to deal with their energy security issues in bilateral relations 
with Russia, and in this way it has hampered EU level efforts to create a common 
EU energy policy towards energy -supplying countries.
Even though the above bilateral agreements are not problematic from a legal 
point of view, they are problematic from the point view of EU interests in energy 
security. These bilateral agreements are becoming an ever -increasing obstacle in 
the forming of a common EU energy policy, especially with Russia, since Russia is 
conditioning the construction of the pipelines with certain demands, which tend to 
be a breach of EU legislation (aquis communautaire). We can understand that the 
EU Member Countries wish to ensure their energy security, but these agreements 
are frequently concluded at the expense of common EU energy policy. German 
and Italian and to a certain extent Hungarian and Bulgarian activities in this regard 
can be described as typical, and common to almost all EU member states (Bailllie, 
2006). In all countries energy markets are dominated by national energy suppliers. 
The German E. ON and the Italian ENI are both working closely with the Russian 
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Gazprom (E: ON North stream; ENI South Stream), since they are trying to ensure 
their market positions and business outcomes are as good as possible, and they see 
cooperation with Gazprom as a good business opportunity and as a way to ensure 
a stable and reliable energy supply. In spite of the fact that this, in the short term, 
creates monopolistic or semi -monopolistic markets with relatively high levels of 
stability and good economic outcomes for involved companies, it is damaging in 
the long run. Because this practice is undoubtedly damaging to the common EU 
energy strategy, it limits the choices of other Member States and makes the EU 
more exposed to different external pressures. In this respect the supply -cut in Janu-
ary 2009 was a grim sign of things to come in the future. This is why EU member 
states should learn from the last gas war and should take measures to diversify 
sources of energy supply on the one hand and to strengthen the robustness of the 
EU energy market on the other. In this time of recession the EU should consider 
building a network of gas and oil pipelines which would enable all EU member 
states to access energy sources available within the frame of the EU. We should 
interconnect national gas and oil pipelines in a common EU network, which would 
lower the energy dependence and vulnerability of many EU members. At the same 
time all EU members should provide themselves with robust and substantial energy 
reserves which could supplement this gas and oil pipeline network in a time of 
crisis.
In addition, we should not forget that the EU is involved in an energy race for 
access to Caspian and Central Asian energy sources (Kimmage, 2006). This is be-
coming an area where a new Great Game is taking place, as this area possesses 
an estimated 5 per cent of world oil and gas reserves (Johnson, 2005: 274). These 
reserves would be sufﬁ cient for the EU to be completely independent of Russian or 
Middle East oil for almost 70 years (Forsythe, 1996: 6). The race is even tougher 
because Russia perceives this area as a vital strategic interest over which it must 
exercise direct or indirect control. Russia will try by any means possible to prevent 
the inﬂ ux of western inﬂ uence into the region, or at least to minimize EU and US 
inﬂ uence and to strengthen its control over oil and gas exports from both regions. 
For Russia this is evidently a power game and the West, not only the EU, should 
learn a lesson from the last episode with Manas airbase in Kyrgyzstan. At the mo-
ment the race to gain access to Central Asian resources is ﬁ ercest between Russia 
and the US, but China is also joining them from the other geographical side. In this 
respect the EU is losing this race even though a non -Russian pipeline from Central 
Asia is of vital importance for EU energy security. We should be aware of the fact 
that once the Russian controlled pipeline network is open, there will be neither 
political nor economic interest in EU pipeline projects. The EU should pursue its 
own interests in the region by promoting cooperation and stability, but should also 
act more actively and with far more determination, since the results of this game 
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will determine the development of energy markets in the foreseeable future.
Conclusion
We can conclude that even if EU -Russia relations are inﬂ uenced by a high level 
of interdependence, this does not necessarily indicate harmonious relations. Since 
Russian foreign and energy policy is becoming more and more similar to the re-
alistic scenario and Russian energy development to a mix of the Russian bear and 
Kuwaitization scenarios with elements of Rent seeking scenario, the EU should 
deﬁ nitely establish its own clear and far -reaching strategy of relations with Russia, 
with a special emphasis on energy security. The EU should try to form a common 
policy towards Russia that would bring national policies and the existing common 
EU policy closer together, which is important for EU -Russia relations and coop-
eration. It is vital for the EU to be uniform in its response to Russian pragmatic 
foreign policy. Member States should forget their sometimes egoistic short -term 
interests for the sake of common long -term beneﬁ cial results. This does not mean 
that the EU should ignore Russian interests; on the contrary, it should take Russian 
interests into account, but it should also clearly present its own interests to Russia. 
In other words, we should tell Russia where the line we are not willing to cross is. 
Furthermore, the EU should be more active and interest -driven in obtaining access 
to dispersed energy sources. This does not necessarily mean entering into conﬂ icts 
with other states, but we should not let other countries gain monopolies over energy 
sources vital for the future of the EU in the ﬁ eld of energy. In this respect the EU 
should use mainly its“ soft” power and the prestige it enjoys in those parts of the 
world. The long -term strategic optimum for the EU would be a geo -energy common 
space in which all major energy producers relevant for the EU would be included; 
all transit states and also all consumer states. In this way unproductive tensions 
could be avoided and everyone involved would beneﬁ t. Since, however, this is only 
possible on a long -term basis, in the short term the EU should be more egoistic in 
securing its own energy security than it currently is.
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